Reinforcing a regime: strengthening clientelism in Iran with sanctions by Baker, Timothy P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-09
Reinforcing a regime: strengthening clientelism in
Iran with sanctions
Baker, Timothy P.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
REINFORCING A REGIME: STRENGTHENING 








Thesis Advisor:  Robert E. Looney 
Second Reader: Anshu Chatterjee 






















REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
REINFORCING A REGIME: STRENGTHENING CLIENTELISM IN IRAN 
WITH SANCTIONS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S) Baker, Timothy P. 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
When examining the effects of economic sanctions, the contentious debate over what constitutes 
success or failure often overlooks the sanctions’ externalities. This thesis examines the externalities of 
sanctions inside Iran in an effort to answer the question: “How have economic sanctions targeting Iran 
affected domestic Iranian politics, and to what degree have these effects influenced the Iranian regime?” 
Through extensive research regarding Iran’s class, economy, and politics, this thesis examines the 
characteristics of Iranian class structure, the measurable impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy and 
resultant economic policy shifts, and how these factors influence political behavior. This research 
concludes that sanctions have strengthened political clientelism in Iran, and are in turn reinforcing the 
Iranian regime’s hold on power. The implications provide critical context for policy makers working 





14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Iran, sanctions, clientelism, class 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
75 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Timothy P. Baker 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., The George Washington University, 2010 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 






















Mohammed Hafez, Ph.D. 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
When examining the effects of economic sanctions, the contentious debate over 
what constitutes success or failure often overlooks the sanctions’ externalities. This thesis 
examines the externalities of sanctions inside Iran in an effort to answer the question: 
“How have economic sanctions targeting Iran affected domestic Iranian politics, and to 
what degree have these effects influenced the Iranian regime?” Through extensive 
research regarding Iran’s class, economy, and politics, this thesis examines the 
characteristics of Iranian class structure, the measurable impact of sanctions on the 
Iranian economy and resultant economic policy shifts, and how these factors influence 
political behavior. This research concludes that sanctions have strengthened political 
clientelism in Iran, and are in turn reinforcing the Iranian regime’s hold on power. The 
implications provide critical context for policy makers working toward a U.S. strategy 
that will provide Iranian people the necessary resources to exert their political will. 
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This thesis attempts to answer the question: “How have economic sanctions 
targeting Iran affected domestic Iranian politics, and to what degree have such effects had 
an influence on the Iranian regime?” Specifically, this thesis addresses how sanctions 
impact Iranian political actors, influence political behavior, and thus affect the Iranian 
regime’s political interests. These effects are then examined in order to determine if 
sanctions are producing the intended effect or if they are producing some unanticipated 
externality. 
In assessing the impact of sanctions in Iran, this thesis examines the evolution of 
Iranian class structures in order to understand the Iranian society’s socioeconomic 
interests. Further, the impact of economic sanctions in the Iranian economy and 
subsequent reform efforts are illustrated, demonstrating how sanctions have catalyzed 
changes in domestic policies. Finally, the manner in which such domestic policy changes 
have impacted the socioeconomic interests of Iranian society is demonstrated, revealing 
the causal linkage between sanctions and domestic political behavior. 
A. THE VALUE OF RESEARCH 
Although the field studying economic sanctions is filled with extensive research, 
it focuses primarily on sanctions’ successes or failures. While it is useful to identify 
factors that may prove predictive, and, thus be of potential value for policy makers,1 this 
approach overlooks sanctions’ intermediary effects. In short, such an approach overlooks 
how sanctions influence politicians to act, and eventually—sometimes well after the 
sanction episode has ended—produce an outcome that can be judged either a success or a 
failure. 
Determining how sanctions against Iran precipitate political behavior promises to 
yield a great deal of insight into if sanctions are driving the Iranian domestic political 
system to produce an outcome aligned with the goals set by policy makers. Moreover, 
                                                 
1 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, eds. Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: 1990).  
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this insight will provide the context required to reveal any unanticipated effect sanctions 
may be having and offer an opportunity to make a course correction so that the final 
outcome may be judged a success. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
Drawing from the large body of work illustrating how sanctions have directly 
influenced Iran, it is apparent that sanctions are largely responsible for the majority of its 
citizens’ hardships. Further, this body of work reveals that inflation, growing 
unemployment, and expanding debt are making it increasingly difficult for the Iranian 
government to provide their citizens with critical political goods and services. Based on 
this preliminary research, it is tempting to conclude that sanctions are having the desired 
impact on the Iranian economy; however, a closer analysis of domestic economic policy 
reveals that Iran’s dire situation may, at least in part, be self-inflicted. 
The fact that Iranian economic policy has been fraught with gross 
mismanagement since the 1979 Islamic Revolution suggests that the government is 
making policy decisions for purposes other than economic growth. Again, based on 
preliminary research, this assertion is supported by the evidence of enormous government 
subsidies and welfare programs. Given the government’s increased difficulty in providing 
political goods and services critical to maintaining legitimacy, research for this thesis 
began with the following hypothesis: the Iranian regime is using its authority to set 
economic policy in a manner that redirects economic resources in the form of 
government assistance in an effort to counteract the delegitimizing effects of sanctions 
and, thus, ensure its continued retention of power. In short, sanctions are preventing 
liberalization in Iran by strengthening the patron-client relationships that the Iranian 
Regime relies on to retain power. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of work centered on Iran is enormous and contains analyses of a myriad 
of topics. To review each source that proved valuable in this thesis would be too 
expansive for an introduction; however, out of this vast body of work, three focuses have 
proved particularly useful: class, economy, and politics. Each area contains extensive 
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resources that reflect differing approaches and opposing theories; the most valuable of 
these were reviewed for this thesis.  
Of the scholarship focusing on class, Max Weber’s Economy and Society served 
as an excellent starting point in the effort to define Iranian class structures. Emphasizing 
the mobility of class situations, Weber’s theory offered a more robust explanation of the 
transitory nature of Iranian class types than a Marxian emphasis on class rigidity.2 
Additionally, work by Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad in Class and Labor in Iran 
provided an outstanding analysis of the evolution of class hierarchies within Iran, 
illustrating Weber’s theories.3 Most valuable in understanding the class dynamics within 
Iran was Kazem Alamdari’s piece for Third World Quarterly, titled “The Power Structure 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from Populism to Clientelism, and 
Militarization of the Government.” This work illustrated the clientelistic nature of the 
Iranian class structure and provided a context in which to evaluate contemporary Iranian 
class interactions.4 
Within the vast amount of data available focusing on the impact of sanctions on 
the Iranian economy, the countless reports completed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank, Congressional Research Service (CRS), RAND Corporation, and 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) all proved invaluable. This body of work 
provided an excellent illustration of how the Iranian economy has been affected over the 
most recent three decades, beginning with the first round of sanctions against Iran in 
1980. Moreover, these sources demonstrated not only the measurable economic impact 
sanctions have had, but also the economic policy implications these sanctions have 
produced within Iran. 
                                                 
2 Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978), 302. 
3 Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad, Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? (Syracuse, 
NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006). 
4 Kazem Alamdari, “The Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Transition from Populism to 
Clientelism, and Militarization of the Government,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 8 (2005), 
doi:10.1080/01436590500336690. 
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Finally, research focusing on the political realm within Iran was aided by 
scholarly articles and books written on Iran’s less-than-transparent domestic political 
processes. Chief among these sources was the book Going to Tehran, written by Flynt 
Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett. These authors provided an objective, evidence-based 
evaluation of the Iranian electoral process, shedding light on a murky topic on which 
many scholars have been able to only speculate.5 Additionally, A. William Samii’s piece 
titled “Iran’s Guardians Council as an Obstacle to Democracy,” in Middle East Journal, 
provides a concise and clear illustration of the role played by Iran’s unelected leaders 
within the domestic political realm.6 Again, work by the RAND proved valuable, 
revealing the pervasive role of the Islam Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within Iran 
in a 2009 report titled The Rise of the Pasdaran.7 Together, these sources revealed the 
structural framework of Iranian domestic politics, providing the perspective required for 
evaluating the impact sanctions have had on political behavior in Iran. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Relying heavily on government and nongovernmental organization reports and 
secondary sources, research for this thesis was conducted in three phases. The beginning 
phase centered on identifying Iranian political actors and the socioeconomic interests that 
influence their behavior, in order to establish the context in which sanctions are having an 
effect. The next phase focused on understanding the structural limitations sanctions have 
imposed on Iran, and the impact those limitations are having. Finally, the third phase of 
research investigated the political relationship between the government and society of 
Iran, in an effort to determine how one may influence the other.  
Seeking to reveal the political landscape within Iran, initial research for this thesis 
focused on developing an understanding of Iranian class structure—including class 
mobility, cross-class associations, and the evolutionary process that produced the 
                                                 
5 Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to 
Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: Picador, 2013). 
6 A. William Samii, “Iran’s Guardians Council as an Obstacle to Democracy,” Middle East Journal 
55, no. 4 (2001), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329688. 
7 Frederic M. Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009). 
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hierarchy observed in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) after 1979. Additionally, this 
research focused on relationships external to the class hierarchy—namely, the political-
military realm of Iranian society. The second phase was split into two main efforts. First, 
build an understanding of what sanctions are, to what ends they are employed, and how 
they are structured. Next, determine the measurable economic impact sanctions have had, 
and reveal whether any subsequent Iranian economic policy decisions are attributable to 
the impact of sanctions. Based on the findings of phase two, the third phase evolved into 
an investigation of how sanctions induced policy decisions that have subsequently 
influenced the political behavior of Iranian society, and to what ends that behavior has 
impacted the Iranian regime. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized chronologically according to the research method, 
comprising five chapters: 
Chapter II defines class within Iran, lays out the evolution of Iranian class 
hierarchy, and illustrates the clientelistic nature of Iranian society. 
Chapter III defines sanctions as a coercive tool, establishes the framework of U.S. 
sanctions against Iran, demonstrates the measurable economic impact of sanctions in the 
Iranian economy, and reveals the relationship between sanctions and Iranian attempts at 
economic reform. 
Chapter IV examines Iranian attempts at economic reform, illustrates how reform 
attempts have strengthened clientelism in Iran, demonstrates the effects of clientelism in 
presidential elections, and reveals the regime’s use of clientelism to maintain power. 
Chapter V provides a conclusion to tie the findings of this thesis together, presents 
the implications of these findings, and offers recommendations regarding continued 
sanctions against Iran. 
 6
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 7
II. IRANIAN SOCIETY 
To determine how economic sanctions impact domestic Iranian politics, the first 
step is to understand the socioeconomic system in Iran and identify the actors who are 
most impacted by the sanctions. The second step identifies the associations within a 
society that span social classes, and determines whether allegiances within classes or 
across classes are stronger, in order to understand which factors influence class behavior. 
This chapter focuses on the evolution of the social hierarchy within Iran, demonstrating 
the similarity between preindustrial and modern Iranian class structures in order to 
provide context for examining the social and political implications of economic sanctions 
against the contemporary IRI. Understanding why Iranian class structures behave in the 
manner they do provides the basis for explaining unanticipated externalities produced by 
sanctions against the IRI. 
A. CLASS DEFINED 
The substantial body of work focusing on Iranian society and class structure 
provides an equally vast number of similar—albeit nuanced—definitions of class. Many 
scholars focus specifically on social factors, while others take a strictly economic 
approach, resulting in a topography that is difficult to navigate when mapping the 
evolution of Iranian class structure. For the purpose of consistency, evidence presented in 
this chapter is analyzed within the context of Weber’s class theory, permitting the 
assembly of evidence within a single framework and providing a unified vernacular for 
analysis. 
Weber defined class as “all persons in the same class situation.”8 Further, he 
defined a class situation as “the typical probability of procuring goods, gaining a position 
in life, and finding inner satisfactions.”9 He also explained that in this context, probability 
“derives from the relative control over goods and skills and from their income-producing 
                                                 
8 Weber, Economy and Class, 302. 
9 Ibid. 
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uses within a given economic order.”
10
 This is all to say that class is not defined by a 
rigid position in society. Class situations may change as probabilities change, and thus, a 
class has mobility along the spectrum of class hierarchy. 
Furthermore, Weber identified three common class types: property, commercial, 
and social.11 Within the property and commercial class types, Weber explained, there are 
varying degrees of privilege. Those persons who are positively privileged within the 
property or commercial class types have—based on possession of capital or skill—the 
greatest probability of maximizing Weber’s class situation criteria, and vice versa.12 The 
position of each class type along the spectrum of class hierarchy is the product of relative 
economic power and, thus, is rigid. Changing class situations may then influence the 
economic power of a group, resulting in changes to that group’s class type, and its 
corresponding residency along the spectrum. 
Finally, Weber outlined four social classes within the social class type: “the 
working class … the petty bourgeoisie … the propertyless [sic] intelligentsia and 
specialist … [and] the classes privileged through property and education.”13 These social 
class types parallel the most commonly understood stratification of class: upper, middle, 
and lower. The varyingly privileged property and commercial class types fit into Weber’s 
social class type spectrum based on economic activity and, thus, the degree of privilege 
experienced in each class situation. For example, the negatively privileged property class 
types fall into the bottom of the spectrum, as they must rely on a degree of skill rather 
than possession of property to achieve Weber’s class situation criteria, whereas the 
positively privileged property class type falls into the top of the spectrum.  
We can apply this to the Iranian setting, where the class structures have shifted 
tremendously in the past century. The following section delineates the fluidity of Iranian 
class setting, demonstrating the evolution of class in Iran from the premodern period, 
                                                 





through the twentieth century, to a regression in which the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
shapes modern Iran. This evolution fits well within Weber’s framework. 
B. PRE-REVOLUTION SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
A comprehensive historical account of the evolution of classes in Iranian society 
is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, a brief overview is necessary in order to 
understand modern Iran and the shifts it has experienced. Beginning in the nineteenth 
century, Iran’s nascent social classes evolved into the traditional capitalist model and 
eventually returned back to the nineteenth century structure following the Islamic 
Revolution. 
In 1981, Ahmad Ashraf described the nineteenth century Iranian social hierarchy 
as comprising the ruling elite (ummal), clergy (ulama), and bazaari merchants.14 Ashraf 
observed a lack of a bureaucratic apparatus—a premodern setting—during this time, 
which contributed to the blurring of the line between private and official.15 This lack of 
delineation permitted the ummal to treat all property within their respective spheres of 
influence as personal,16 effectively providing them with Weber’s optimal class situation 
as a positively privileged property class type.17 Falling below the ummal in the social 
hierarchy, the ulama can be classified as a combination of positively privileged property 
and commercial class types, as they controlled less property than the ummal, but their 
expertise provided substantial power over matters political and economic.18 The power of 
the ulama rested squarely on their responsibility for Islamic jurisprudence, and thus, their 
ability to shape the behavior of a society that turned to them for guidance in all matters of 
life. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the bazaari merchants, who were a hybrid of the 
neutrally privileged property and commercial class types. This group’s power was 
                                                 
14 Ahmad Ashraf, “The Roots of Emerging Dual Class Structure in Nineteenth-Century Iran,” Iranian 
Studies 14, no. 1/2 (1981): 7, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4310351. 
15 Ibid., 8. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Weber, Economy and Society, 302–303. 
18 Ibid. 
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founded in control of the goods and skills required for the myriad of services demanded 
in an economy. 
The constitutional movement of 1906 brought a more clearly delineated social 
hierarchy within Iranian society.19 The creation of the new constitution marked a major 
step in centralizing state power under the shah. Included in the new constitution were six 
clearly defined subgroups: “(1) princes and other members of the Qajar family; 
(2) notables; (3) ulama; (4) merchants; (5) masters of artisans and shopkeepers; 
(6) landowners.”20 Although six separate strata were delineated, regulatory contradictions 
within various legal instruments ultimately resulted in the elimination of the “notable” 
category. It was combined with “landowners,” resulting in only five categories.21 These 
new subgroups would, based on their respective proportion of society, elect 
representatives to the newly created legislative assembly.22 Simultaneously, a more 
robust state apparatus was created by the arrival of foreign economic interests in Iran’s 
oil resources. This new apparatus included a formal bureaucratic process that reduced the 
blurring of lines between the private and official, and thus removed some of the privilege 
enjoyed by the ummal.  
The implementation of the constitution in 1906 formalized the position of the 
various class situations within the Iranian class structure. However, the new bureaucratic 
system reduced the ability of the ummal to use their position in society to misappropriate 
capital for personal gain, and it increased the ability of private citizens to acquire and 
retain capital—thus facilitating the creation of a positively privileged property class that 
comprised the private sector. In turn, the elimination of control over property changed the 
ummal class situation to that of a positively privileged commercial class type, subjugated 
to the newly redefined private-sector property class type. 
Displaced by the ummal, the ulama were consequently relocated to the middle 
classes—adjacent to the bazaari—as a hybrid of the positively and negatively privileged 
                                                 
19 Ashraf, “Dual Class Structure,” 9–10. 
20 Ibid., 11. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 10. 
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commercial class type, whose class situation rested on a degree of expertise in religious 
matters.23 The new position of the ulama resulted in a redefinition of the middle classes 
to include both the clergy and bazaari merchants.24 This allowed the ulama to reinforce 
its political and economic power through cooperation with the bazaari merchants.25 
Mosques served as the center of Islamic communities, where the bazaari and less 
privileged property and commercial classes gathered routinely for worship and religious 
guidance. As a result, the ulama began leveraging their influence over the commercial 
and negatively privileged property classes of the bazaari in order to bring about 
government action.26 Additionally, the ulama relied on the financial support of the 
bazaari in order to maintain the mosques and religious schools.27 In return for bazaari 
financial support, the ulama provided a degree of protection for the merchants and 
workers by advocating mutually beneficial economic policies.28 This relationship 
between the ulama and bazaari proved incredibly resilient—surviving even the Islamic 
Revolution—and it still exists in Iranian society to this day. 
For Iran, the arrival of the twentieth century brought with it Western business 
interests that would start the process of building a capitalist market. The opening of the 
Suez Canal, along with the arrival of steamships and new railways significantly reduced 
transportation expenses, thus encouraging new foreign investment.29 The emergence of a 
fledgling capitalist market space had a stark impact on the social structure within Iran. 
The arrival of foreign investors provided an opportunity for the positively privileged 
property class types to increase their stake in the economy. The subsequent 
industrialization of the economy as a result of capitalist influence also drew labor 
resources away from the bazaars.30 The middle classes were now divided between the 
                                                 
23 Ashraf, “Dual Class Structure,” 8–12. 





29 Ibid., 19. 
30 Ibid. 
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traditional Iranian marketplace and the newly created commercialized shopping centers 
and factories.31 The arrival of Western capitalist influences seeking Iranian oil came with 
interests in colonization by foreign governments. Although Iran was never formally 
colonized, a dual social structure emerged that was similar to those found in formally 
colonized states.32 In twentieth-century Iran, the traditional social structure was 
subjugated to the new semi-colonial structure, placing the two at odds with one another.33 
This new semi-colonial structure comprised positively privileged entities of the British 
government and business—entities that began absorbing the traditional positively 
privileged Iranian class situations. Competing interests between these two social 
structures would result in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and ultimately precipitate a 
complete realignment of the Iranian social structure.  
C. POST-1979 SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
While a detailed historical analysis of the conditions that resulted in the 1979 
Islamic Revolution is also beyond the scope of this chapter, a general overview is 
necessary. Ostensibly, the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by the 
Iranian government signaled the beginning of a process in which the occupants of the 
traditional Iranian social structure would defeat the more recently developed semi-
colonial structure. The new positively privileged property classes were more concerned 
with a capitalist agenda than with preserving the tenets of a traditional Islamic, Iranian 
society. The perception of boundless profit-seeking and an apparent abandonment of the 
precepts of social justice precipitated a desire to rid the nation of Western influences and 
return to the principles of Islam, which promised to enhance the welfare and well-being 
of society. The success of the ulama in leading the Islamic Revolution resulted in a 
complete realignment of the social order in accordance with the principles of Islamic 
economics. 
                                                 
31 Ashraf, “Dual Class Structure,” 19–20. 
32 Ibid., 19. 
33 Ibid., 22–23. 
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Since the emergence of the very first Islamic societies, religious leaders have 
grappled with how to constrain economic activity in a manner that facilitates social 
justice but also permits economic growth. More recently—in the two decades preceding 
the 1979 Revolution—Iranian sociologist Ali Shariati began espousing his own idea of an 
Islamic economic philosophy,34 although his approach should be considered an extreme 
interpretation of the balance between Islam and economic activity. Shariati framed his 
philosophy as the alternative to secular Western-style capitalism.35 In fact, he traced the 
origin of his two proposed alternatives back to Cain and Abel, asserting that the murder 
of the pastoral Abel by the landed Cain marked the beginning of class struggle.36 Dr. 
Sohrab Behdad of Denison University succinctly observed: “according to Shariati, 
societies can only have one of two possible social structures: a classless society, as in 
primitive and advanced communism, which he calls ‘the structure of Abel’; or a class 
society, as in slavery, feudalism, and capitalism, which he calls ‘the structure of Cain.’”37 
Shariati’s philosophy highlights the two ends of the spectrum in which modern Iran’s 
economy now falls. 
Although Ayatollah Khomeini did not subscribe to Shariati’s view on Islam, the 
language he used certainly echoes Shariati’s. Referring to Western powers, Khomeini 
stated in 1971 that they “have imposed upon us an unjust economic order, and thereby 
divided our people into two groups: oppressors and oppressed.”38 In Khomeini’s view, 
despite the various class situations experienced by each Iranian class type, all Iranian 
classes were being oppressed by the Western oppressors. This line of thought essentially 
created a single new Iranian class that he intended to pit against the positively privileged 
property classes, which he framed singularly as the oppressors. Further analysis of 
Khomeini’s rhetoric reveals he had a more nuanced view of class within Iran; however, 
                                                 
34 Sohrab Behdad, “A Disputed Utopia: Islamic Economics in Revolutionary Iran,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 36, no. 4 (October 1, 1994): 778–779, http://www.jstor.org/stable/179172. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 779. 
38 Ibid., 805. 
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until he was able to rid the country of Western influences, it would be “the oppressed 
against the oppressors.” 
With the ratification of the new Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
direction of the new government was made clear to the world. Comprising 175 principles, 
the constitution was at best ambiguous and at worst contradictory, resulting in a  
great deal of uncertainty regarding the future administration of the country. While it 
remained to be seen how the power structure would work in practice, the central theme of 
expelling foreign interests was clear. Principle five requires the “complete expulsion of 
colonialism, and prevention of foreign influence.”39 Principle forty-three requires 
“preventing foreign economic domination of [Iran’s] economy.”40 Principle forty-nine 
was perhaps most troubling to foreign investors and domestic elites, as it stipulated that 
any wealth or property acquired in a manner in conflict with Islam shall be confiscated 
and “assigned to public use.”41 It was clear to those members of the classes Khomeini 
considered the oppressors that they were no longer welcome and their property rights 
would not be respected. The result was a period of divestment and capital flight that 
precipitated nearly a decade of structural involution.42 
During the ten years of involution that followed the 1979 Revolution, class 
situations changed significantly. As the positively privileged property class types—the 
semi-colonial and traditional—began divesting their holdings and leaving the country, 
new opportunities were created for the less privileged class types.43 Following principle 
forty-nine of the new constitution, the wealth amassed by the shah and his supporters was 
appropriated to the public sector in the form of Islamic charities (bonyads), to be 
administered by the ulama within the religious apparatus of Iran. The ulama, which now 
                                                 
39 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, “Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Middle East Journal 34, no. 
2 (April 1, 1980): 189, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326018. 
40 Ibid., 193. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Sohrab Behdad and Farhad Nomani, “What a Revolution! Thirty Years of Social Class Reshuffling 




controlled the government, had essentially brought the Iranian social structure full circle 
to the premodern Iranian system, once again blurring the line between private and 
official. As before, the leadership of Iran moved into the positively privileged property 
class type position, only this time the ulama expanded from straddling the line between 
positively privileged property and commercial class types. The ulama now occupied both 
the upper- and middle-class positions in society, enabling the leadership to tout Iran as a 
nation of the middle classes. 
An economic study completed by Behdad and Farhad Nomani revealed that the 
process of involution that occurred in Iran had a greater effect than simply allowing the 
various class situations in society to change position within the social hierarchy. Their 
findings, published in 2009 in the journal Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East, reveal that the involution process had a dramatic effect on economic 
activity within the domestic Iranian economy. The study found that “as capitalist 
productions shriveled, petty commodity economic activities expanded.”44 Additionally, 
the data revealed that this trend led “to a de-proletarianization of labor, reflected in the 
decline in size of the working class and a dramatic expansion of petty bourgeois and 
redundant service activities in the urban and rural economies.”45 Further, the study 
showed an increase in peasant landholdings that correlated with increased peasantization 
of the agricultural sector.46 The employment statistics for this time period additionally 
demonstrate a significant increase in the number of public-sector jobs, which correlates 
with the involution-induced shrinkage of the private-sector working classes.  
Behdad and Nomani also demonstrated that the involutionary process was 
reversed following the death of Khomeini, when the new generation of Iranian leaders 
undertook liberalization measures.47 Although only small attempts were made to 
revitalize the economy through limited privatization and the implementation of a policy 
encouraging capitalist production, these attempts did have an effect on the composition of 
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the classes.48 The data indicate that during the period of de-involution, defined as 1986–
1996, there were limited reversals between the public and private sectors.49 This reversal 
trend resulted in a tripling of private-sector employment numbers, while public-sector 
employment numbers fell dramatically, coincident with the conclusion of the Iran–Iraq 
War.50 Although involution ended in 1986 and signs of de-involution emerged, the de-
involutionary period did not reverse the effects of the class realignment. The two periods 
between 1976 and 1996 can be viewed as oscillations, as the new leaders of the Islamic 
Republic sought a politically viable economic policy for the new state. Contemporary 
Iran’s social hierarchy remains dominated by the ulama at the top as a positively 
privileged property class, followed by a bloated public sector comprising the positively 
and negatively privileged commercial classes. The class realignment precipitated by the 
Islamic Revolution has produced an environment in Iran in which traditional class 
behavior and mobility no longer exists, effectively creating a status quo that inhibits 
economic development. The new class behavior in Iran closely resembles that of the 
premodern period, and is the reason sanctions are having an unanticipated effect on 
modern Iranian domestic politics. 
D. TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CLIENTELISM 
There is much evidence to suggest that Iran is a clientelistic society, in which the 
function of class structure is effectively eliminated. In such a society, it remains possible 
to categorize groups based on their class situation in accordance with Weber’s theory; 
however, while class stratification may be observed, classes will not function in the same 
capacity as a class in a Western capitalist society. Unlike a capitalist society, in which 
classes obtain the resources for mobility from free-market economic activity, a 
clientelistic society obtains economic resource from a patron government. As a result, a 
patron government may regulate the availability of resources, and thus, suppress class 
mobility in order to retain power and maintain a positively privileged class situation. 
                                                 




In an article for Third World Quarterly, Kazem Alamdari described in detail the 
clientelistic nature of Iranian society. He defined clientelism as “a structured relationship 
between a patron and client.”51 This relationship can exist in many forms—ranging from 
the most common form of a customer in a business, to the less commonly conceived 
construct of a citizen exchanging political support for goods or services provided by a 
member of a government apparatus. Alamdari traces the origin of this type of relationship 
to Shia Islam—the Islamic sect that predominates the country. He argues that the Shia 
practice of selecting a clerical leader to emulate (marja’a taqlid) has ingrained 
clientelism into Iranian culture.52 As evidence for the persistence of this practice in 
modern Iran, Alamdari cites the common practice of parliament (Majlis) representatives 
seeking approval from the ulama before initiating legislation.53 He argues that this 
practice has resulted in a situation “in which the elected legislative body takes a 
subordinate position to an influential clergy and its associates.”54 This phenomenon 
should not come as a surprise, since Iran is an Islamic society which requires all laws to 
be in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence, and where only the ulama hold the religious 
authority to make such judgments. As noted previously, clientelism can exist in many 
contexts and, as such, is not limited to the religious realm in Iran. Alamdari observed 
three prerequisites for clientelism to exist: “1) inequality of power, status, and wealth; 2) 
reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services; and 3) the proximity of personal and 
face-to-face relationships.”55 All three of these requirements can be observed across the 
spectrum of Iranian society. 
With the ulama once again—as a result of the revolution—in the position of a 
positively privileged property class type, they now have a monopoly of power, status, and 
wealth. The preexisting practice of marja’a taqlid constitutes Alamdari’s prerequisite two 
in the religious realm. Additionally, within the political realm, the practice of government 
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subsidies constitutes an exchange of goods and services, as it incentivizes the population 
to continue supporting the politicians who advocate maintaining subsidies. Finally, the 
requirement for face-to-face proximity is satisfied by the relationship between the 
mosque and bazaar. Since the initial formation of the nineteenth-century class structure, 
the situation of mosques as community centers provided the clergy with proximity to the 
bazaari class.56 As early as the nineteenth century, the ulama were engaged in a 
clientelistic relationship with society in the political and religious realms. As a result of 
the revolution and the repositioning of the ulama in the social structure, the Iranian 
regime now has the wealth and power required to exert maximum influence. 
The effects of clientelism are readily observable in the expanded role of the state 
in society since the 1979 Revolution. Since the revolution, the bureaucratic apparatus, the 
military, and the paramilitary forces all play a pervasive role in the Iranian political and 
economic realms,57 once again blurring the lines between public and private that were 
observed in premodern Iran. The growth of the government has resulted in an oversized 
public sector, and only serves to reinforce clientelistic relations within the country by 
positioning the government as not only the largest employer, but also the largest holder of 
economic resources within Iran. 
Created to protect the revolution, the IRGC has emerged as the largest actor in the 
economic realm. Originally conceptualized during the revolution and solidified in the IRI 
constitution,58 the ostensible role of the IRGC is to defend the Iranian revolutionary 
government from internal threats.59 However, in the years since, the role of defender has 
taken many forms, precipitating the evolution of a monopolistic conglomerate comprising 
the modern IRGC. As one top IRGC official put it in 2007, “the major missions of the 
IRGC involve defense, security, and cultural issues and its peripheral missions are related 
to the construction of the country and carrying out relief and rescue operations during 
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natural disasters.”60 The pervasive role of the IRGC and its affiliates has only contributed 
to further blurring the lines between the public and private realms, and recreating the 
conditions observed in premodern Iranian society. 
Within the military and paramilitary sects of society, the Revolutionary Guards 
and its affiliates far outnumber the size of the regular Iranian military forces. Following 
the Iran–Iraq War, the IRGC was able to consolidate its power, absorbing the smaller 
vigilante groups known as komitehs (committees) and recruiting the same population 
base to its civilian auxiliary, known as the Basij. The growing Basij forces took over the 
role of the komitehs as local enforcers of revolutionary ideals and provided the IRGC 
with what can effectively be described as reserve forces that can be called up for military 
service as had been done during the Iran–Iraq War. Conceptualized as a twenty-million-
man force by Khomeini, the Basij grew to what one IRGC commander described as  
“the 36 million [member] information network.”61 In a country with a population of 
70.5 million,62 there is a ratio of roughly one Basij member for every two Iranian 
citizens. The pervasiveness of the Basij network dwarfs that of the East German Stasi 
during its prime, which had a ratio of only one Stasi member for every sixty-six East 
Germans.63 
On one hand, the success of Basij recruiting can be attributed to the perception of 
its role in the “sacred defense” of the Islamic Republic.64 On the other hand, it can also 
be attributed to a lack of employment opportunities in a stagnant economy. The human 
wave tactics employed by Iran during the war with Iraq relied primarily on Basij forces 
that viewed service through a fervent ideological lens and relished the opportunity to 
become martyrs for Iran.65 Today, there is still a portion of the Basij that can be 
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described as ideologues who are attracted to the possibility of martyrdom; however, 
research from RAND suggests that a significant number of the Basij ranks are occupied 
by “disaffected youths and elderly pensioners,” who cannot be accurately described as 
primarily ideologues.66 The modern Basij has branched out, creating units offering goods 
and services that would otherwise be unavailable to the targeted recruitment base in 
exchange for their support. These services include “loans, university scholarships, 
welfare subsidies, and the like.”67 The RAND report cites one Basij member as stating, 
“the only reason I stay in the Basij is for the money … many of my friends in the Basij 
are unhappy with the government.”68 Additionally, in the rural areas of the country, Basij 
units often garner support by providing disaster relief or constructing infrastructure.69 It 
is clear that the practices of the IRGC in the military and paramilitary realms of Iranian 
society support the clientelistic relationships between the people of Iran and the 
government. The success of the IRGC in recruiting participants and solidifying its 
position within society is directly attributable to its offer of goods and services in 
exchange for support. 
Although the IRGC began as a military organization, its involvement in modern 
Iranian society has grown significantly—to include a significant portion of the economic 
realm beyond the common military-industrial complex. This growth began with the 
conclusion of the Iran–Iraq War, as the byproduct of government attempts to stimulate 
the economy. The initial forays of the IRGC were in the form of loans and welfare to 
veterans of the war with Iraq, and then expanded rapidly in the 1990s under President 
Rafsanjani in an attempt to increase income levels.70 Initially, Rafsanjani’s attempt at 
economic stimulation via the IRGC resembled a New Deal–style arrangement in which 
government-sponsored infrastructure development and construction projects were 
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designed to provide jobs; however, jobs were not all that it created.71 The growth of the 
IRGC’s commercial subsidiaries was paralleled by the growth of its economic might. 
High-ranking retired IRGC and regular military officials can be identified as the leaders 
of nearly all IRGC commercial entities, providing a robust network for a system of 
patronage and cronyism.72 The effect of this network is exemplified by the lucrative 
position in which the IRGC found itself under President Ahmadinejad—also a former 
IRGC member.73 RAND found that under Ahmadinejad, the IRGC enjoyed “lucrative 
no-bid contracts, especially, in the areas of oil and natural gas extraction, pipeline 
construction, and large-scale infrastructure development.”74 Furthermore, the IRGC has 
significant interests in the bonyads (Islamic charities), which by some estimates control 
up to 20 percent of Iran’s gross domestic product. At the time of the RAND report on the 
IRGC, a former defense logistics minister and a former IRGC officer controlled the two 
largest bonyads.75 In addition to providing substantial wealth to the leaders of the 
bonyads, it is estimated that these organizations provide upward of 50 percent of their 
revenue to the negatively privileged class types in the form of interest-free loans and 
welfare-like services.76 These services undoubtedly create a dependency on the bonyad in 
a staggering economy where the lower classes have no other recourse than to rely on 
handouts. Once again, the evidence of IRGC involvement in the economic realm of 
Iranian society demonstrates yet another example of clientelism in Iran. The commercial 
network of cronies and systems of patronage serve to offer economic power, prestige, and 
mobility to participants, encouraging the desire to maintain the status quo political system 
that permits such an enterprise to persist. 
The reach of the IRGC and its business affiliates has not only permeated the 
commercial sector of the Iranian economy, but it has also facilitated the creation of an 
expansive secondary market. The same networks that permit unregulated IRGC 
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participation in the commercial sector have enabled IRGC entities to engage in expansive 
smuggling, money laundering, and other illicit activities.77 One member of the Majles 
estimated that “one third of the imported goods are delivered through the black market, 
underground economy, or illegal jetties.”78 While empirical evidence is lacking on the 
exact scope and nature of the Iranian black market, the availability of prohibited items 
such as alcohol, drugs, and media deemed un-Islamic suggests a robust secondary market 
where such items are easily acquired.79 RAND contends that the IRGC’s control of 
necessary port facilities, military equipment, and commercial networks positions it as the 
prime mover in Iran’s secondary market.80 Yet again, the evidence of the IRGC’s 
contribution to a clientelistic society is substantial. The secondary market undeniably 
creates a strong incentive for participants to maintain the status quo, particularly for those 
who are reaping the financial benefits. 
This chapter illustrates how class plays a meaningful role in Iranian society 
despite external notions that Iran is focused primarily on religion. From the premodern 
era to the post revolutionary period, Iranian class hierarchy has come full circle. Yet, 
while classes may be discerned, the clientelistic nature of Iranian society has eliminated 
the primary element of a class: mobility. In a traditional capitalist society where 
economic development is not restrained, the various classes would have the resources at 
hand to move within the social hierarchy; however, in Iran this is not the case. 
Clientelism in Iran has created a dependence on the government and other economic 
powers that provide the resources required for day-to-day life, creating a strong 
disincentive for the Iranian people to stop supporting their economic patrons. This is the 
reason sanctions have unintentionally strengthened the position of the government of 
Iran. In this type of clientelistic society, increasing resource scarcity via sanctions has 
only induced a greater dependence of society on the government, and incentivized the 
people to maintain political support for the hand that feeds them.  
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III. IMPACTING IRAN’S ECONOMY 
The second step in determining how economic sanctions have impacted domestic 
Iranian politics is an examination of the current body of sanctions targeting Iran, in  
order to reveal the first- and second-order effects sanctions are having within Iranian 
society. This chapter will begin with a brief overview of sanctions in general—what they 
are, and to what ends they are often employed. This will be followed by an examination 
of the specific U.S. sanctions measures aimed at Iran, revealing the current structural 
framework of Iran’s domestic economy, and illustrating the first-order effects—the 
immediate economic impacts—of these sanctions. Finally, this chapter will examine what 
can be described as the externalities of sanctions—the second-order effects—that can be 
seen in the domestic policies precipitated by the first-order effects of sanctions. 
Although considerable scholarship has been dedicated to studying the successes 
and failures of economic sanctions as a strategic tool in coercing the behavior of a target 
government, very little has been committed to understanding the externalities implicit to 
all sanctions. As with any economic policy, the implementation of an incentive or 
disincentive scheme results in economic behavior not anticipated by policy architects. 
Because little is understood about the externalities of sanctions, the nature of unintended 
political behavior within Iran remains largely a mystery. In an effort to unravel this 
mystery, this chapter will illustrate not only the measurable impact sanctions are having 
on the Iranian economy, but also the reciprocal economic policies adopted by the Iranian 
government. These will then be further considered in the next chapter, within the context 
of the clientelistic nature of Iranian society. 
A. SANCTIONS: A COERCIVE TOOL 
As defined in the introduction to Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, edited by 
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, sanctions are “a tool 
for coercing target governments into particular avenues of response.”81 Depending on 
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which avenue a sender government may desire the target government to traverse, the 
intent behind a sanctions episode will vary. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott identify three 
common motives behind a sanctions episode. The “demonstration of resolve” is an 
episode imposed to signal the sender government’s dissatisfaction, in principal, with the 
target government’s behavior.82 The “deterrence” episode is imposed by the sender 
government in the hope that sanctions will either dissuade certain behaviors or impede a 
certain capability of the target government.83 Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott do not assign 
a name to the third type; however, this chapter will refer to it as the “middle road.” In this 
instance, political conditions may demand a response to a target government’s behavior 
that is more robust than a “demonstration of resolve” but still short of armed force—a 
response that combines “demonstration of resolve” and robust “deterrence” measures.84 
As there are varying motives behind sanctions episodes, so too are there varying types of 
sanctions a sender government may impose. 
There are two overarching categories of sanctions: trade and financial.85 
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott observe that a combination of these two sanction types are 
often employed in order to “inflict costs on [the] target: by limiting exports, by restricting 
imports, and by impeding finance, including the reduction of aid.”86 Based on the study 
in Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott’s book, they conclude that sender governments strive to 
inflict costs on target governments in an attempt to accomplish at least one of the 
following objectives: 
 “Change target-country policies in a relatively modest way (modest in the 
scale of national goals, but often of burning importance to participants in 
the episode); this type of goal is illustrated by human rights, terrorism, and 
nuclear nonproliferation cases.”87 
                                                 
82 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, “Sanctions Revisited,” 11. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., 36. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., 38. 
 25
 “Destabilize the target government (including, as an ancillary goal, 
changing the target country’s policies).”88 
 “Disrupt a minor military adventure.”89 
 “Impair military potential of the target country.”90 
 “Change target-country policies in a major way (including the surrender of 
territory).”91 
Implicit to the infliction of costs on a target government is the infliction of costs 
on the society of a target state—comprising consumers and firms that play a role within 
the political environment. These implicit costs often take the form of inhibiting economic 
growth, devaluing currency, and increasing the difficulty consumers have acquiring 
critical goods and services. The main precipitate of these increased costs is government 
action designed to sate the political demands of consumers facing the sudden stagnation 
of their economic environment. Examining the sanctions measures in place against the 
Iranian economy reveals the structural limitations consumers and firms are facing and 
provides a basis for understanding what has catalyzed the economic hardships currently 
faced in Iran. 
B. U.S. SANCTIONS EFFORTS 
Since 1979, the United States has wielded sanctions against Iran in one form or 
another in response to behavior deemed unacceptable on the international stage. Since 
1995, in response to increased nuclear development efforts and mounting evidence of 
terrorism sponsorship, the United States has undertaken a new series of sanctions that can 
be classified in aggregate as a “middle road” coercive tool. Individually, the various 
measures can be classified as either “demonstrations of resolve” or “deterrence” 
measures; however, in whole the body of sanctions since 1995 are a significant 
demonstration of resolve aimed at deterring abnormal Iranian behavior through denial of 
access to financial resources. Examining sanctions measures since 1995 reveals the 
                                                 





methodology adopted denying Iran access to the resources required for continued 
abnormal behavior, and illustrates the architecture of the enormous framework currently 
in place isolating Iran from the global financial system. This isolation has been reached 
by three primary strategies of the sanctions: the inhibition of trade, the freezing of assets, 
and the denial of access to global financial systems. 
The measures in place for inhibiting trade take many forms, ranging from 
blocking investment to restraining the exchange of goods and services. Beginning in 
1995, Executive Order 12957 blocked U.S. investment in the Iranian petroleum 
industry,92 effectively isolating it from capital available in the U.S. financial system. That 
same year, Executive Order 12959 prohibited importing or exporting Iranian goods and 
services or financing the exporting of any goods and services to Iran.93 Additionally, this 
executive order banned any transaction by a U.S. person involving goods of Iranian 
origin, and any investment in Iran or in Iranian property.94 This order effectively 
eliminated any U.S. demand signals for Iranian goods or services. 
In addition to inhibiting trade, U.S. sanctions have authorized the seizure of assets 
belonging to both Iranian entities and the entities with which they transact. The first 
measure to authorize asset seizure was Executive Order 13224. This order blocked all 
assets under USG jurisdiction, of any person determined to “have committed, or pose a 
significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. 
nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the U.S.”95 Executive 
Order 13382 expanded the authorization to block assets to include any entity determined 
to have contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.96 Further, 
Executive Order 13522 directed the seizure of assets belonging to specific individuals 
within the Iranian government who were determined to have contributed to serious 
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human rights abuses of Iranian citizens.97 Under the National Defense Authorization Act 
of 2012, the USG was authorized to seize all assets owned or controlled by the Iranian 
banking sector.98 Executive Order 13599 expanded that authorization to include any 
entity transacting with, or acting on behalf of, the Iranian banking industry.99 Executive 
Order 13628 expanded authorization to seize the assets of any individual determined to 
have contributed to media censorship, and to block any sanctioned person from 
immigrating to the United States.100 Executive Order 13645 authorized the seizure of 
assets of any financial institute holding or transacting in rial-denominated currency.101 
The aggregate effect of asset seizure has denied the Iranian government, petroleum 
industry, and banking sector access to vast resources held by sanctionable firms. 
Additionally, the authority to seize assets has created a strong disincentive, encouraging 
firms to avoid transacting with Iranian entities. 
The most significant effect of U.S. sanctions stems from its ability to prohibit 
access to the global financial system. Beginning with the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, any financial transaction by a U.S. person with any Iranian 
entity was made illegal. Designed to further isolate Iran from the global financial system, 
the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended 50 U.S.C. § 1701, (ISA), expanded USG 
authority to penalize both U.S. and foreign financial firms violating sanctions 
measures.102 Further, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
Act of 2010 had the added effect of expanding the penalties under ISA. Under the new 
legislation, sanctionable entities can be denied any of the following services: “export-
import bank loans, credits, or credit guarantees for U.S. exports…licenses for the export 
of military technology…U.S. bank loans exceeding $10 million in one year,” and 
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“service as a primary dealer in U.S. government bonds.”103 Moreover, sanctionable 
entities are prohibited from serving as a repository for U.S. government funds or serving 
as a procurement source for the U.S. government and from acquiring, holding, or trading 
any U.S.-based property.104 Furthermore, sanctionable entities face import, foreign 
exchange, and payment restrictions, all of which severely limit access to U.S. financial 
institutions.105 Executive Order 13574 further expanded the penalties under ISA by 
prohibiting sanctioned entities from: 
 receiving loans or credits from U.S. financial institutions106 
 engaging in any foreign-exchange transactions under the jurisdiction of 
the United States107 
 transferring any credits or payments through financial institutions under 
U.S. jurisdiction108 
 accessing any property interests under U.S. government jurisdiction109  
 importing goods, technology, or services into the United States110 
This order also reinforced the disincentive scheme aimed at dissuading 
individuals from transacting with Iran, further shrinking the pool of resources available to 
Iranian firms. Under Executive Order 13590, additional punitive measures were 
authorized against the Iranian petroleum industry—to accompany those already aimed at 
the banking industry.111 Executive Order 13622 expanded these financial sanctions 
against the petroleum industry to include any entity transacting with Iranian oil 
companies.112 The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 then solidified 
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into U.S. law all sanctions measures imposed by executive order.113 All of these 
sanctions measures, designed to prohibit access to financial systems around the world, 
created a robust disincentive scheme dissuading entities from transacting with Iran. 
When considered in whole, these sanctions measures comprise an enormous and 
sweeping framework isolating Iran from the global economy. Under less sweeping 
sanctions, comprehensive access to the U.S. financial system would not be denied; 
however, under the current framework the United States is able to coerce unprecedented 
international support by denying access to the world reserve currency—the U.S. dollar—
to any entity that does not comply. The potential loss a financial institution faces for 
violating sanctions constitutes a greater risk than the financial loss from ceasing 
transactions with Iran. Undeniably, this body of sanctions has had a devastating impact 
on the Iranian economy. This impact is what constitutes first-order effects, all of which 
are readily observable in Iran’s oil industry, economic growth indicators, and banking 
sector. 
C. ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
The extensive body of scholarship attempting to assess the success or failure  
of sanctions has done an outstanding job isolating the evidence indicating their  
first-order effects in an economy occluded with rampant corruption and economic 
mismanagement.114 Out of this body of work, organizations such as the IMF, CRS, GAO, 
and RAND provide detailed accounting of the measurable impact sanctions have had on 
the Iranian economy.  
The most readily observable evidence of the impact that sanctions are having 
resides within the Iranian oil industry. As early as February 2013, the GAO published 
findings—based on a comparative study of Iran and twenty-three peer economies—
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indicating that Iranian oil production declined 26 percent more than expected.115 
Additionally, Iranian oil revenues fell about 18 percent between 2010 and 2012, while 
peer revenues rose 50 percent during that same time period.116 IMF findings indicate that 
“oil export receipts have declined by over 50 percent since mid-2012, mostly reflecting a 
decline in oil export volume.”117 The GAO attributed this decline to the increased 
difficulty the Iranian shipping industry faced in finding insurance for shipments as a 
result of potential U.S. sanctions against entities insuring or underwriting transactions 
with Iran.118 The IMF observed, “Oil production fell to a 20-year low, oil-export 
proceeds declined by more than half (by about 15 percent of GDP),”119 indicating  
that isolating the Iranian oil sector effectively suppressed the global demand signal for 
Iranian oil. 
As a direct result of declining oil revenues, Iranian gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth contracted sharply, and inflation began rising again. Based on the same study of 
23 peer economies, the GAO determined that Iran’s GDP “grew by 1.9 percent in 2011 
and shrank by 1.4 percent in 2012,” while “Iran’s median peer economy grew by 
4.2 percent in both 2011 and 2012.”120 During this same period, inflation in Iran 
“increased from almost 8 percent in 2010 to 27 percent in late 2012.”121 The GAO 
attributes this rapid inflation to increased transaction costs for imports resulting from 
Iran’s isolation from U.S. financial institutions.122 Assessing the impact of additional 
sanctions implemented in 2011, the IMF determined that increased isolation from the 
global financial system resulted in a 25 percent depreciation of the Iranian parallel market 
                                                 
115 U.S. and International Sanctions Have Adversely Affected the Iranian Economy (GAO 13–326) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 28, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
13-326. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Alfred Kammer and Taline Koranchelian, “2014 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Press 
Release; and Statement by the Executive Director for the Islamic Republic of Iran,” IMF Country Report 
14/93 (April 2014): 7, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1493.pdf. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid., 29–30. 
121 Ibid., 33. 
122 Ibid., 34. 
 31
exchange rate.123 In September 2012, following a shock brought on by the European 
Union oil embargo, the parallel market exchange rate depreciated again by 30 percent.124 
During the following month—October 2012—the rial depreciated again by 8.5 percent, 
driving the Iranian government to establish a foreign exchange center in order to stabilize 
currency valuation.125 The IMF assessed that “these shocks imparted significant 
contractionary effects on the economy, with real GDP declining by almost 6 percent in 
2012/13. During the first half of 2013/14, real GDP is estimated to have declined by 
about 2.5 percent, compared with the same period in the previous year.”126 
The effect of sanctions on the Iranian oil industry—and the resultant impact on 
GDP growth—has had a significant impact on the Iranian banking and industrial sectors. 
The CRS assesses that “many Iranian businesses have failed, the number of 
nonperforming loans held by Iranian banks increased to about 15–30 percent, and many 
employees in the private sector have gone unpaid or underpaid.”127 According to IMF 
estimates, nonperforming loans in 2012–2013 placed at nearly 10 percent of Iran’s nonoil 
GDP—as a result of waning cash flows in the private and public sectors.128 The IMF 
asserts that the inability to access foreign-held assets is inhibiting access to hard currency, 
and that this is directly contributing to rising arrears in the Iranian economy.129 
The CRS points out that sanctions can be credited with decreasing Iran’s oil 
revenue “from $100 billion in 2011 to about $35 billion in 2013.”130 Compounding the 
effects of these dire economic conditions is the fact that sanctions have rendered the 
majority of Iran’s hard currency reserves inaccessible, since they are held in foreign 
banks subject to U.S. sanctions measures.131 Even more troubling for Iran is that 
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sanctions have resulted in the devaluation of the rial, assessed to have induced an 
inflation rate of 50 percent to 70 percent.132 The CRS cites that “Secretary of the 
Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen testified before  
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21, 2015, that Iran’s economy is  
15–20 percent smaller than it would have been had sanctions not been imposed.”133 The 
evidence of first-order effects of U.S. sanctions on the Iranian economy is clear, and the 
cumulative impact of these sanctions is producing a second-order effect: a response from 
Iranian economic policy makers. 
D. IRANIAN RESPONSE 
At the beginning of 2010, facing more stringent sanctions and a stagnating 
economy, the Iranian government undertook a process of subsidy reforms. This reform 
was designed to diminish the effects of declining oil revenues, and the certainty of 
continued declines—which were directly attributable to the effects of sanctions.134 
Preceding the implementation of reforms, the government artificially controlled price 
structures of critical resources such as gasoline, electricity, and food, in the form of 
subsidies valued at approximately $100 billion.135 The objective of the reform was to 
remove subsidies, incrementally raise prices, and offset the effects of these increases with 
cash handouts to qualifying households. Ultimately, the combination of subsidy reform 
and new sanctions produced severe negative shocks to the Iranian economy and, most 
significantly, increased the costs of production.136 The inability of Iranian firms to access 
capital in the international financial system exacerbated the negative impact of increased 
                                                 
132 Kammer and Koranchelian, “IMF Country Report 14/93,” 9. 
133 Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions (CRS Report No. RS20871) (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 2015), 50, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf. 
134 Dominique Guillaume, Roman Zytek, and Mohammad Reza Farzin, Iran-The Chronicles of the 
Subsidy Reform, IMF working paper no. WP/11/167, July 2011, 3–8, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11167.pdf. 
135 Alireza Nader, “Iran Overhauls Subsidies in the Face of Sanctions,” The RAND Blog, January 13, 
2011, http://www.rand.org/blog/2011/01/iran-overhauls-subsidies-in-the-face-of-sanctions.html. 
136 Ozgur Demirkol et al., Islamic Republic of Iran: Selected Issues Paper. IMF Country Report no. 
14/94 (March 18, 2014), 24, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1494.pdf. 
 33
production costs.137 Subsequently, the Iranian government halted price increases, but 
continued providing cash payments to consumers—producing a significant inflationary 
effect. The IMF assessed that sanctions had “impaired the CBI’s ability to transact in 
dollars, [and] the CBI, therefore, did not intervene on a large scale in the foreign 
exchange market to sterilize the large liquidity injections throughout the year.”138 These 
effects of sanctions—subsidy reform, cash handouts, and increasing inflation—had a 
dramatic influence upon Iranian society. This influence has produced a unique political 
behavior that constitutes the main externality of economic sanctions against Iran: the 
strengthening of political clientelism in Iran. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Analysis of sanctions in the preceding chapter revealed that U.S. sanctions 
targeting Iran are designed to accomplish the first of the five objectives that Hufbauer, 
Schott, and Elliott’s identified: “change target-country policies in a relatively modest 
way.”139 And indeed, Iran has been pressured to make policy changes; however, those 
changes remain primarily confined to domestic policy. The incredible pressures that these 
sanctions placed on Iran precipitated the attempted effort to reinvigorate the Iranian 
economy with subsidy reforms.140 While efforts to mitigate the effects of sanctions are 
not in themselves abnormal, and should not be considered an externality, the domestic 
reform measures are producing unanticipated political and economic behavior in Iranian 
society.  
Manifesting in 2010 under the Targeted Subsidies Reform program, Iran’s internal 
policy changes exhibit all the characteristics of a clientelistic arrangement on a national 
scale. The implementation of the program has only served to strengthen the patron–client 
relationship between the government and people of Iran—in what was already a strongly 
clientelistic society. The evidence is clear that sanctions have strengthened Iranian 
clientelism in a manner that reinforces the regime’s monopoly on power, as well as its 
resistance to liberalization efforts.  The bottom line is that sanctions have been so 
effective preventing economic development that they have denied the Iranian people 
access to the resources required for class mobility. As a result, the Iranian Regime has 
positioned itself as the primary provider of economic resources, inducing society’s 
dependence on the state.  Through this dependence, the Regime has managed to defeat 
liberalization not through fraudulent elections, but through patron-client relations 
indicating that the public’s support for the state is a rational choice and not determined by 
cultural factors.  
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A. SUBSIDY REFORM 
RAND’s Alireza Nader assessed that following the first implementation of 
subsidies after the war with Iraq in the 1980s, “subsidies have become a major burden, 
consuming as much as 25% of Iran’s gross GDP.”141 In a 2011 working paper published 
by the IMF, Dominique Guillaume, Roman Zytek, and Mohammad Reza Farzin, 
observed that Iran’s energy subsidies had grown to the highest of any country.142 They 
also noted that these subsidies had driven a significant increase in energy consumption, 
making Iran “one of the most energy-intensive economies in the world.”143 Over the 
years preceding the adoption of the Targeted Subsidy Reform program, subsidies grew to 
nearly $100 billion annually, consuming a significant amount of government revenue.144 
Guillaume et al. assert that the objective of the Iranian government was to use subsidy 
reform as a method to reduce energy usage and encourage consumption,145 ostensibly to 
offset the effects of declining economic growth in the wake of sanctions. In order to 
encourage economic growth, the Majlis began the reform with a three-pronged approach: 
halting subsidies, incrementally raising energy prices to reflect true market values, and 
offsetting the effects of increased prices with cash handouts.146 As an added benefit, 
consumption levels would increase as consumers spent the cash handouts on other goods, 
in addition to energy purchases. 
In practice, subsidy reform has not accomplished the goals envisioned by Iranian 
policy makers. Unanticipated inflation and foreign exchange market volatility resulted in 
the suspension of the program following the commencement of handouts, but prior to the 
second round of price increases.147 This decision ultimately reinforced the patron–client 
relationship between the people and government of Iran by perpetuating the three 
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requirements for clientelism: “inequality of power, status, and wealth; reciprocity in 
exchange of goods and services; and the proximity of personal and face-to-face 
relationships.”148 
1. Inequality 
Since the practice of subsidizing energy, electricity, and food began in Iran, social 
inequalities relating to power and status have continued to grow. Although the subsidies 
were designed to grant negatively privileged class situations access to markets they 
previously were priced out of, in reality the subsidies rendered such class situations 
dependent on artificially controlled prices. Further, despite expanding access to 
previously priced-out consumers, the benefits of subsidies were still not accessible to the 
least privileged Iranian classes—those that were too poor to afford cars or appliances 
requiring energy consumption. 
Following the implementation of subsidies, energy consumption increased,149 
indicating that consumption patterns within Iran adjusted to the new artificial pricing 
structures. Under the new consumption patterns, any price increase would negatively 
impact economic activity. While subsidization resulted in lower prices and increased 
consumer access to markets, artificial pricing rendered consumers dependent on the 
officials responsible for maintaining subsidies—the same officials who were not 
themselves affected by the conditions subsidies were designed to alleviate.150 Subsidies 
recreated the conditions of preindustrial Iran; the least privileged Iranian class situations 
were again dependent on the positively privileged classes running the government. 
The implementation of the Targeted Subsidy Reform program was intended to 
reverse the effects of artificial prices controls, but this proved difficult, given the body of 
sanctions already in place and the political intransigence within Iran. As a result of the 
2011 Majlis decision to halt the reform program, subsidized price levels remained 
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relatively unchanged, but allowed even the poorest Iranian to continue benefiting from 
artificially low prices. The large liquidity injection of cash handouts, combined with the 
continuation of artificially low pricing, resulted in yet another significant adjustment of 
consumption patterns. Figures published in the IMF Country Report 14/94 indicate that 
beginning in quarter four of 2010, the private consumption growth rate began a period of 
increase, rising from 0 percent in 2010Q4 to about 15 percent in 2011Q3.151 Ultimately, 
by halting the reform program before raising prices, the government increased the 
percentage of the population dependent on government assistance. Subsidy reform did 
not improve the economic conditions for the least privileged class situations; rather, 
reform increased dependence on government assistance provided by officials who 
enjoyed the most privileged class situations. 
2. Reciprocity 
In addition to growing inequality and dependence on government handouts, 
subsidy reform strengthened reciprocity in the exchange of goods and services inherent in 
a patron–client relationship. The goods and services being exchanged in this case are 
government monies in exchange for political support. During the period of product 
subsidization, the government supported a policy directly benefiting the average Iranian 
consumer, who provided political support for leaders that advocated for continued 
assistance in exchange for continued subsidies. Such support takes the form of votes cast 
in favor of pro-subsidy candidates in elections, and the continued acceptance of the 
legitimacy of Iran’s unelected leaders. The prospect of eliminating subsidies was 
troubling for both the government and the people of Iran, for the reason that Guillaume et 
al. observed: “historically, in most countries, the elimination of subsidies to staple 
products results in loss of real income that disproportionately affects poorer 
households.”152 Additionally, Guillaume et al. argued that “for this reason, the Iranian 
authorities emphasized from the outset that the reforms were not about eliminating 
subsidies, but switching subsidies from products to households. The reform would 
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therefore benefit poor households, who would receive cash benefits, while in the past 
they were not benefitting much from cheap energy that was mostly consumed by the 
richer groups.”153 
Addressing the likelihood of strengthening domestic support for new cash 
handouts, Guillaume et al. estimated that “for the poor who benefited little from cheap 
domestic energy prices, the compensation would represent a large share of their income, 
lifting virtually every Iranian out of poverty. This gave the government a powerful public 
relations and moral argument in support of the reform.”154 The IMF assessed that 
“transfers for families were, on average, more than increased expenditures on utility and 
energy related items, notwithstanding the increase in prices of other items in the 
consumption basket.”155 Cash handouts were valued by the IMF at “445,000 rials (about 
US$ 45 when the reform was launched) per person,” representing “about 15 percent of 
the average income of a median family of four in 2011.”156 The expanded scope of 
government assistance in the form of handouts increased the number of individual 
Iranians receiving government assistance and subsequently increased the percentage of 
the population dependent on artificial market controls—thus making them more likely to 
cast votes in favor of candidates advocating continued assistance. The government 
officials attempting subsidy reform knew they had to walk a fine line—implementing 
reform measures in order to maintain public support, and at the same time improving the 
economy. This balancing act is evident in the Majlis decision to halt incremental price 
increases after external shocks to the economy effectively negated the positive effects of 
the reform. The political leaders of Iran ran the risk of increasing economic hardship for 
the average Iranian citizen if they continued the process of subsidies they had started. 
Striving to maintain the support elicited from government handouts, the 2011 Majlis 
decision—while it halted the reform program—ensured continuation of the handouts. 
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A face-to-face relationship between patron and client is a central factor of basic 
clientelism. Conventionally, this is illustrated by a merchant–customer relationship in 
which the patron is a merchant controlling some good that is traded for some other good 
held by a client. This type of transaction may occur face-to-face in a place of business, 
but may also take place in an electronic setting absent any direct human interaction. What 
is important in this transaction is that the patron holding the good or service being sought 
and the client offering another good or service as payment are both known to the other, 
and that there is high certainty of reciprocity in the exchange of these goods and services. 
Transactions of this nature—where patron and client are known to one another—create a 
sense of obligation between the transacting entities, further solidifying the contractual 
nature of such exchanges. Transpose these characteristics over the process of distributing 
cash handouts to the citizens of Iran, and it becomes clear that the relationship 
requirement for political clientelism is fulfilled. 
In the case of Iran’s government assistance programs, the sense of contractual 
obligation induced by the relationship between the patron government and client society 
has varied. With the implementation of subsidies in the 1980s, the patron government 
was certainly known by the client-society, but behind the scenes subsidization was easily 
overlooked in the daily life of the average Iranian. As such, the sense of contractual 
obligation for reciprocity incurred from subsidies was weak relative to the sense of 
obligation induced from direct cash handouts. The formation of the new, stronger patron-
client relationships based on handouts began with an application process that was open to 
nearly every Iranian citizen. The IMF observed that “[Iranian] officials reported an 
exceptionally high approval rate for all applicants of 98 percent.”157 By the time the 
handouts were accessible for the first time, 61 million Iranians had signed up.158 This 
meant that in a population of approximately 75 million, about 80 percent were receiving 
government handouts.159 Even after the handouts were available to consumers, the 
                                                 




government made it clear that applications were still being accepted for those who had 
not yet signed up, and that late applicants would receive retroactive payments.160 
In the months preceding implementation of the Targeted Subsidy Reform 
program, the public relations campaign conducted by the Iranian government revealed 
how important it was for officials to make sure that Iranian citizens were aware of the 
role the government was playing in providing the new handouts. The IMF observed that, 
“to ensure publicity of the process, the Iranian mass media reported daily on the progress 
made in distributing the compensatory deposits.”161 Thrusting the government’s action 
into the media ensured every citizen was aware of who the patron was, and reinforced the 
clientelistic relationship between handout recipients and politicians who facilitated them.  
Additionally, the government chose to use banks throughout the country to 
distribute the new cash handouts to eligible households.162 The IMF asserts that in 
addition to alleviating the logistical burden of distributing large amounts of cash, creating 
bank accounts for households in advance “allowed the government to let all the recipients 
see the transfers received well in advance of the actual price increase.”163 Moreover, the 
IMF assessed that “this consideration was very important in gaining the public’s buy-in 
for the reform, and making it virtually irreversible, as many Iranian households would 
eagerly await the price increases that would give them access to the deposits.”164 The 
process of distributing cash electronically to individual bank accounts constituted the 
formation of direct patron–client relationships between the government and its citizens. 
B. REINFORCING THE REGIME  
RAND’s Alireza Nader predicted that “an overhaul of the subsidies system would 
enable Iran’s increasingly militarized government to better resist U.S. and international 
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pressures,”165 and it is evident that the Targeted Subsidy Reform program has done just 
that by strengthening political clientelism. Subsidy reform has increased the inequality 
gap in Iran between powerful government officials and weaker, less privileged classes. 
The heightened inequality has increased the average Iranian’s dependence on the 
government, and thus, served to reinforce the reciprocity in exchange of government 
assistance for political support. The transition from subsidies to cash handouts expanded 
the number of individuals benefiting from the new compensation, and it had the added 
effect of creating a daily reminder of the role played by the government in their economic 
viability. In testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, James Dobbins stated that sanctions have historically “bolstered the 
targeted regimes domestic political support” and, as such, “have both moderated and 
perpetuated the threat such regimes present.”166 The outcomes of the 2005, 2009, and 
2013 Iranian presidential elections confirm the validity of Dobbins’s observation.167 
When Iranian voters went to the polls in 2005, the ballot contained six names: 
three reformists and three principlists.168 Of the reformists, former president Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani emerged as the main contender against the front-running 
conservative principlist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Since his name was associated with 
accusations of corruption and misappropriation of oil revenues,169 Rafsanjani was widely 
perceived as a holdover from a troubled period in the short history of the Islamic 
Republic. Farhang Morady argued in a 2010 article for Capital & Class that most 
Iranians blamed former President Rafsanjani “for all their economic difficulties, not to 
mention great political and social injustices.”170 Born into a middle-class family, the son 
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of a blacksmith,171 Ahmadinejad appeared as the antithesis to the wealthy Rafsanjani. As 
mayor of Tehran, Ahmadinejad mastered his common-man image wearing nondescript 
clothing and avoiding the opulence often associated with the ruling elite. During his time 
as mayor, he introduced “a program of low-interest loans that gave young men the funds 
to start a household.”172 During his campaign for president, he advocated the creation of 
similar programs on a national scale,173 gaining widespread support from the less 
privileged classes. Further, running on a populist platform supporting economic relief for 
the average Iranian, Ahmadinejad promised to put the country’s oil money back into the 
hands of the citizens.174 Winning in a run-off election with 62 percent of the vote, 
Ahmadinejad delivered on his promises by lowering interest rates on loans, raising the 
minimum wage, and supporting pensions for civil servants.175 Emphasizing the strength 
of domestic support for the new president, Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett 
observed that “[Ahmadinejad’s] initiatives were popular with the constituencies that 
supported him; if, in some cases, they did not achieve their stated objectives, these 
constituents tended to blame the corrupt interests against whom the president continued 
to rail.”176 Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election demonstrated the Iranian people’s desire for a 
better economic future—and in this case, that future was dependent on government 
assistance that would ultimately create dependence rather than prosperity. 
When the polls opened for the 2009 presidential election, the Iranian people were 
again faced with a choice between a candidate associated with economic hardship and a 
candidate with a populist track record who promised greener pastures. This time the 
ballot contained four names: two reformists and two principlists.177 Of the reformist 
candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi emerged as the primary contender for the incumbent 
conservative Ahmadinejad. As the voice of the less conservative and liberal left-wing 
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Iranians, Mousavi advocated a platform focused on limited democratization measures 
designed to roll government and religious authority back to the limits defined in the 
Iranian constitution.178 The Mousavi camp primarily comprised positively privileged 
classes of financially stable and well-educated elites,179 indicating that issues of 
democratization were only of concern to those citizens who were not dependent on 
government assistance. Moreover, Mousavi’s earlier track record as prime minister 
revealed that he was not an adept economic policy maker. Leverett and Leverett pointed 
out that his policies as prime minister were “widely judged to have exacerbated wartime 
shortages of food and other essential commodities”180 during the Iran–Iraq War. Further, 
Leverett and Leverett argued that “Ahmadinejad was particularly effective in linking 
Mousavi to Rafsanjani, and, by extension, to Rafsanjani’s son, who had been publicly 
accused of Corruption.”181 As a result of these assertions, Mousavi experienced popular 
sentiments similar to those that hampered Rafsanjani in the 2005 election. Moreover, 
Morady points out that incumbent “Ahmadinejad had the support of Khomeini, different 
state foundations, the IRGC and a section of the bazaar, as well as that of the right-wing 
clergy in Qom.”182 It is clear that Ahmadinejad held the support of both the client-society 
and traditional Iranian patrons. 
Two front-runners emerged from the six contenders in the 2013 presidential 
election: Mohammad Galibaf and Hassan Rouhani. Considering Galibaf’s poor economic 
track record—including rising levels of poverty in Tehran while he was mayor183—it is 
little wonder that he did not win the support of a population in a stagnant economy. This 
election marked a change of political course for Iran, moving from Ahmadinejad’s 
conservative administration to Rouhani’s more progressive approach. Yet, despite the 
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new rhetoric of reform and thawing relations with the West, Rouhani’s campaign did not 
indicate a departure from status quo economic policies. Although Rouhani’s campaign 
rhetoric featured criticism of Ahmadinejad’s tenure as president and worsening economic 
conditions,184 Rouhani did not run on promises of rolling back subsidy reform. Since his 
election, his methodology looks very similar to that of his predecessor. Rouhani’s 
continued support for government assistance programs indicates that he is a slave to 
clientelism just as much as Ahmadinejad was. In fact, the government of Iran declared 
that it is still spending about $1.2 billon a month on cash handouts.185 In April 2014, 
Iranian officials announced the resumption of reform measures under the Targeted 
Subsidy Reform program, confirming the Rouhani administration’s commitment to the 
reciprocal exchange of government assistance for political support. 
C. DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 
The reciprocity created in a patron–client relationship requires a client’s 
continued desire for what a patron is offering. If that desire ends, the relationship is 
dissolved. Following this logic, the assertion that political clientelism is strengthening the 
Iranian regime requires that the client-society have autonomy of choice in its selection of 
political leaders, in order to demonstrate the desire to continue a patron–client 
relationship. Many observers of the Iranian election process argue that elections are 
predetermined and outcomes are rigged—and as a result, the Iranian people do not 
actually have autonomy of choice in the electoral process. The validity of this argument 
rests squarely on the assertion that Iranian elections are fraudulent; however, this 
approach is not supported by evidence, and it overlooks the fine nuances of the regime’s 
cunning coercion of voters. 
To begin with, the assertion that the Iranian regime has a monopoly of power is 
valid; however, this monopoly is not maintained by removing autonomy of choice—but 
rather by ensuring voters do have the freedom to choose. The regime’s power originates 
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in the organization of the government under the Iranian Constitution, which authorizes 
Ayatollah Khameini to function as not only supreme leader but also supreme patron. 
Under the convoluted system of theoretical checks and balances created in the IRI 
constitution, the supreme leader retains his monopoly through enormous influence in the 
selection of the Guardian Council. This influence begins with the authority to directly 
appoint six members of the twelve-member council.186 The remaining six members are 
nominated by the head of the judiciary—a position that is also directly appointed by the 
supreme leader.187 The six nominated individuals then go before the Majlis—a legislative 
body comprising individuals whose candidacy and subsequent election was approved by 
the Guardian Council.188 Furthermore, the Guardian Council, owing all of its power to 
the supreme leader, approves the candidacy and subsequent election of all members of 
the Assembly of Experts—the only body holding the power to remove the supreme leader 
from power.189 Supporters of the fraud narrative cite the clearly conflicted interests of the 
Guardian Council and point to the role the council plays in vetting prospective candidates 
as evidence Iranian elections are not democratic; however, this approach is inconclusive. 
The fraud narrative can only be validated by evidence that somehow indicates autonomy 
of choice has been stolen from the Iranian voter. However, the evidence does not indicate 
that this is the case. Instead, the evidence indicates that the Guardian Council indeed uses 
its authority to engineer elections, but does so in a manner guaranteeing that the final 
outcome is the result of votes cast by Iranian voters, thus ensuring that autonomy of 
choice is maintained. 
The Guardian Council’s practice of vetting candidates before any ballot is 
compiled is no secret, and is generally accepted by Iranian citizens. In a 2001 article for 
the Middle East Journal, A. William Samii pointed out that “the Guardians Council has 
regularly used its constitutional power of ‘approbatory supervision’ (nizarat-e estisvabi) 
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over elections to make sure that only candidates who meet its standards actually serve in 
public office.”190 Based on the candidates who have been permitted to stand for election 
in the past, it is clear that the Council’s standards require loyalty and support for the 
Islamic Republic.191 In reference to the individuals deemed unsuitable to stand for 
election, Samii noted that “many candidates were rejected on the basis of Article 28 of 
the election law, which calls for ‘belief in and practical commitment to Islam and the 
Islamic Republic system’ and loyalty to the Constitution and the Vilayat-e Faqih 
(Guardianship of the Supreme Jurisconsult).”192 Additionally, candidates must espouse a 
platform falling within the precepts of the Islamic republic; however, a candidate’s 
possession of these characteristics hardly ensures permission to run for president. Samii 
pointed out that as early as 1997 the Guardian Council exerted its power to vet 
presidential candidates, when it only approved four of 238 applicants for candidacy.193 
This phenomenon was not only limited to presidential elections; in 1998, the Council 
disqualified more than half of 396 applicants for the Assembly of Experts election.194 
Observing this vetting process, the first president of the Guardian Council—Ayatollah 
Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri-Najafabadi—stated that “the Guardian Council’s decisions were 
motivated by factional political interests, and candidates with impeccable credentials 
regarding devotion to Islam and services to the people were rejected with no legal 
justification.”195 In an attempt to rationalize the use of approbatory supervision to vet 
prospective political candidates, former Guardians Council Secretary Ayatollah Jannati 
has stated that “the people are considered orphans, and the religious scholars are the 
custodians and guardians of their affairs. They are in charge of all the affairs of the 
people.”196 While this evidence clearly suggests that the Iranian regime does not trust the 
people to choose leaders who will not challenge the power of the supreme patron, it does 
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not indicate that the Iranian voter has been deprived of the opportunity to choose once a 
ballot has been assembled. 
Given that the regime is fearful of a political challenge to its power, it is logical to 
conclude the regime is equally fearful of a challenge to power born out of a loss of 
legitimacy. It is for this reason the Guardian Council limits its use of authority to control 
the outcome of elections by arranging a ballot in a manner that gives the appearance of 
fairness in order to maintain the public perception of legitimacy. This appearance of 
legitimacy begins by ensuring the spectrum of the Iranian political environment is 
represented on the ballot. As seen in the last three presidential elections, ballots were 
balanced with an equal number of conservatives and reformists. However, despite the 
spectrum of platforms represented on the ballots, the elections examined in this chapter 
suggest that candidates were approved along political fissures ensuring that only one 
candidate—the one desired by the regime—could achieve a majority vote to win.197 
Moreover, the fact that the winning candidate in each election was also advocating 
continued government assistance indicates that the regime has been using the effects of 
clientelism to its advantage. The regime is maintaining the perception of legitimacy by 
providing Iranian voters with autonomy to choose—albeit, the regime already knows the 
choice. 
Supporters of the fraud narrative often point to the 2009 Iranian presidential 
election and the subsequent Green Movement as evidence of electoral fraud; however, no 
hard evidence of fraud has ever been produced. Many supporters of this narrative point to 
voter intimidation and ballot box stuffing as the main form of fraud, but the available 
evidence indicates that any known instances of intimidation or stuffing had little to no 
impact on the outcome of the election. Although reliable Iranian polling data is scarce, 
the closely monitored 2009 presidential election attracted the attention of several Western 
polling organizations who published their findings. The findings indicate that despite 
raucous accusations of fraud by the defeated Mousavi campaign, Ahmadinejad’s election 
in 2009 was the result of votes cast by the Iranian people. Leverett and Leverett observed 
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that the “methodologically sound” polling conducted in Iran confirms the plausibility of 
Ahmadinejad’s election.198 They define “methodologically sound” as surveys, “drawing 
on samples that are both sufficiently large and random to minimize sampling error and 
using clear and neutrally worded questions.”199 They identify three Western 
organizations that met the standards for sound polling: Terror Free Tomorrow, Globe-
Scan, and World Public Opinion.200 All of the surveys conducted by these organizations 
confirmed a consistent base of support for Ahmadinejad, large enough to produce his 
margin of victory in the 2009 election.201 Based on Ahmadinejad’s populist platform and 
support for continued government assistance in exchange for the support of the Iranian 
people, it makes sense that the clientelistic Iranian society would respond by electing its 
patron. Ahmadinejad’s defeat of Mousavi was political clientelism in action. 
D. BEYOND THE POLITICAL ARENA 
The effects of clientelism in Iran are not restricted to the political realm. As 
demonstrated in Chapter II, cultural and class characteristics of Iranian society predispose 
it to clientelistic relationships. As a result, clientelism strengthened by sanctions has also 
strengthened the position of the IRGC in the economic realm—namely, in the 
cooperative sector of the Iranian economy. By virtue of overlapping private and public 
financial interests, the cooperative sector gives way to deeply conflicting interests. 
Designed to strengthen the domestic economy and benefit society, cooperative sector 
enterprises are ideal entities for business leaders to fill personal coffers with government 
funds. Controlling an overwhelming share of public sector business interests, the IRGC 
has been the largest economic benefactor of strengthened clientelism. 
As outlined in Chapter II, the IRGC obtained a firm position in the domestic 
economy following the Iran–Iraq War and has managed to maintain its financial interests 
ever since. This position has been reinforced by IRGC-controlled bonyads providing 
                                                 





handouts to society, and by IRGC control of secondary markets encouraged by trade 
restrictions imposed by sanctions.202 The election of President Ahmadinejad marked the 
beginning of a period characterized by the unprecedented growth of IRGC financial 
interests.203 As a well-connected former member of the Basij, Ahmadinejad enjoyed the 
combined benefit of possessing both the political ideology of the IRGC204 and access to 
its vast network of cronies. Under Ahmadinejad’s process of privatizing public-sector 
interests, many businesses were transferred to the cooperative sector. Writing in the 
Middle East Journal, Roozebeh Safshekan and Farzan Sabet observed that “privatization 
has meant transferring state assets to the IRGC or to affiliated organizations and 
individuals.”205 Further, writing on IRGC expansion precipitated by privatization, 
Safshekan and Sabet noted that “the Khatim al-Abiya’ Headquarters, the IRGC’s most 
visible economic arm, [since 2006] has gone from being a major government contractor 
to being the single largest recipient of government contracts, often bypassing the bidding 
process completely.”206 In a 2009 report, RAND highlighted that the Iranian Oil Ministry 
awarded Khatim al-Abiya’ “a number of no-bid contracts … worth billions of dollars.”207 
RAND reports that Iranian officials rationalize bypassing the bidding process by arguing 
that such contracts are for the benefit of underdeveloped regions of the country, and that 
the bidding process would delay delivery of the benefits such projects are envisioned to 
provide.208 Ostensibly, IRGC and government officials are aware that a public benefiting 
from such an arrangement is unlikely to raise much concern about conflicting interests. 
Not only has the IRGC reaped the benefits of expanded interests in the primary 
markets through increased political influence under Ahmadinejad, but it has also 
strengthened its hold on secondary markets. Safshekan and Sabet pointed out that one of 
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the first achievements of the IRGC under Ahmadinejad was that “they cemented their 
role as the IRI’s premier security institution.”209 Part and parcel to this cementing was 
improved control of the country’s entry and exit points. Safshekan and Sabet argued this 
gave the IRGC “control over border posts and port facilities, allowing it to enter the 
lucrative business of importing duty-free consumer goods and smuggling.”210 RAND 
cited an unnamed member of the Majlis who speculated that IRGC secondary market 
activity may be up to $12 billion a year.211 Of course, by the nature of secondary 
markets, there is very little data available to prove where such vast amounts of money are 
going; however, following RAND’s logical conclusions, it is safe to say that black 
market money is providing a strong financial incentive to maintain the status quo.212 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the preceding chapters, the effects of sanctions in strengthening the 
Iranian regime’s hold on power have become apparent. Based on the evolution of class 
structures within Iran—from premodern to industrial and back to premodern—the 
predisposition for clientelism in Iranian society is evident. Compounding that 
predisposition with the damaging effects of sanctions has precipitated failed attempts at 
economic reform, which has in turn catalyzed the strengthening of political clientelism. 
Through this newly strengthened clientelism, the regime has retained its legitimacy and 
reinforced its resistance to liberalization. While it appears that counterproductive 
sanctions have created a truly bleak situation in Iran, all is not lost. Rather, a roadmap can 
be derived from the evolutionary process observed throughout this thesis that offers a 
way forward in which a responsible and well-behaved Iran may still be possible. In order 
to achieve this outcome, Western political powers must cultivate an Iranian stake in the 
international political arena that will constrain the IRI’s desire to engage in the 
provocative practices characteristic of the most recent three decades. 
Without a doubt, the current situation in Iran is directly attributable to the 
imposition of sanctions that have further depressed an economy already stagnating from 
the effects of the Islamic Revolution. The isolation induced by sanctions has deprived the 
Iranian economy of capital required to encourage development, and has resulted in 
increasingly dire conditions for the citizens of Iran. Seeking to alleviate such conditions, 
the government’s failed attempt at subsidy reform did not revitalize the economy, but 
rather reinforced political clientelism in the country. Replacing subsidies with cash 
handouts increased the disparity of power and wealth in the country, inducing society’s 
increased dependence on the government. This increased dependence, in turn, increased 
political support for the politicians advocating government assistance programs, further 
reinforcing the regime’s hold on power. 
The starting point for reversing the effects of clientelism and achieving a 
responsible Iranian state resides in the similarities between premodern and post-1979 
Iran. In both of these periods, clientelism is strong and plays a central role in maintaining 
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the blurred lines between the public and private realms. This blurring of lines has enabled 
the Iranian regime to exert undue control over resources and, thus, limit access to the 
economic resources required for class mobility. This denial of resources has led to the 
Iranian society’s dependence on government assistance and has encouraged class rigidity, 
resulting in the inability to challenge government authority—for fear of biting the hand 
that feeds. The clientelistic premodern Iran was transformed into a modern industrializing 
nation at the beginning of the twentieth century through the introduction of foreign 
investment. Seeing that sanctions have effectively reproduced a heavily clientelistic 
society closely mirroring that of premodern Iran, it is then logical to conclude the same 
process that ended the premodern period would also end the post-1979 period of 
clientelism. The first step in achieving a modern, responsible Iran is encouraging 
economic interdependence through foreign investment and participation in global 
markets that can only occur through the easing of sanctions. 
The easing of sanctions will facilitate the economic development necessary to 
provide the Iranian people with the resources required to increase class mobility and 
reduce their dependence on government assistance. Under this eventuality, the choice of 
Iranian voters will no longer be constrained to the candidate favored by the regime—who 
also, conveniently, advocates continued handouts. Providing the Iranian people with the 
means to acquire economic resources from sources other than government handouts will 
end the clientelistic relationship between the patron-government and client-society. The 
government will no longer be able to rely on reciprocity in the exchange of cash handouts 
for political support. Most importantly, freeing the Iranian people from the stranglehold 
of clientelism will lessen the influence of the supreme leader and the Guardian Council.  
Of course, the outcome of lifting sanctions is neither certain nor absent risk. It is 
true that the inflow of revenue that will follow the easing of sanctions may be used for 
nefarious purposes; however, this is unlikely in the near future. Moreover, the Iranian 
government is highly unlikely to adopt a policy of rapidly dumping newly accessed 
capital into already inflated markets, given the government’s decades-long battle against 
inflation. Further, with annual oil revenues more than halved by sanctions, and 
government welfare expenses topping $12 billion annually, there has been little money 
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left for developing and maintaining infrastructure. In order to meet the increased demand 
for Iranian petroleum and other products that will inevitably result from easing sanctions, 
the government will be forced to divert the majority of its newfound wealth to 
revitalizing outdated infrastructure. 
Even riskier than easing sanctions is the option of maintaining the status quo. 
Continued sanctions will only further depress the Iranian economy, creating ever more 
dire conditions for the Iranian people. As conditions worsen, the regime is likely to suffer 
a loss of legitimacy and proceed down the path toward a failed state. Such conditions are 
likely to precipitate the use of violence to maintain state control and result in a 
humanitarian crisis that will lead to the dissolution of international support for continued 
sanctions. This possible eventuality is the worst-case scenario, in which two outcomes are 
possible: 1) The regime is able to retain control in a humanitarian crisis; or, 2) the Iranian 
state fails, resulting in civil war or revolution, adding to the volatility of an already 
unstable Middle East. Given these possibilities, easing sanctions is the only pragmatic 
approach. 
Increasing access to the economic resources required for class mobility is the only 
way to free the Iranian people from the stranglehold of clientelism. This approach 
encourages continued stability in Iran by increasing the ability of society to acquire the 
required goods and services to sate political demands. Maintaining stability minimizes 
the likelihood of humanitarian abuses originating from a failing regime’s violent last-
ditch efforts to retain control. Moreover, mobile classes—free from the effects of 
clientelism—will have the ability to more effectively assert their political will upon the 
course of the Islamic Republic. 
The bottom line is that economic development has once before transformed a 
premodern Iranian class structure into a capitalist structure that sought integration in the 
nascent global economy of the early twentieth century. Lifting sanctions is the only way 
to restart this process in the twenty-first century; however, this time, the pace of 
economic development in Iran must be set by the Iranian people. Liberalization and 
development must occur in a manner respecting the societal values of Iran, and only the 
citizens of Iran can decide the best course for their country. 
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In light of the July 14, 2015 nuclear agreement reached between the countries of 
the P5+1 and Iran, it appears that the people of Iran may indeed soon have the ability to 
begin the arduous process of defeating clientelism. While there is wide debate regarding 
the efficacy of the deal, the fact remains that ratification of the deal will result in the 
easing of sanctions and catalyze a significant inflow of capital into the Iranian economy. 
Many economic actors within Iran will undoubtedly reap enormous personal profit; 
however, this capital inflow will also strengthen the domestic economy, facilitating 
greater ease of access to the goods and services traditionally monopolized by a patron-
government. Wider availability of resources promises to eliminate the reciprocity 
between patron and client, effectively dissolving the stranglehold of clientelism on the 
Iranian people. 
Regardless of the implications this deal has for Iran’s nuclear program, the United 
States has reached the point of no return. Ratification of the agreement by all members of 
the P5+1 except the United States will result in the dissolution of continued Western 
support that is vital to the effectiveness of sanctions. It is important to recognize that the 
July nuclear agreement has signified Iran’s willingness to make concessions in exchange 
for the easing of sanctions—and has resulted in an arrangement better than the status quo. 
The United States must now make the choice to support a nuclear agreement that both 
slows a previously unrestrained nuclear program and also creates the conditions required 
to defeat the regime’s hold on power through clientelism. The alternative is to walk away 
from this deal, losing the support of the international community and further reinforcing 
the Iranian regime’s distrust of the United States. 
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